The Extended Mind theory: psyche beyond our brain

It is well known that the term "mind" refers to the set of cognitive processes, that is, to consciousness, thought, intelligence, perception, memory, attention, and so on. But does the mind have a material reality? Is it a tangible and concrete entity or space? Or, is it an abstract concept that groups together a series of immaterial experiences?

The philosophy of mind, along with cognitive science, have offered different theories to answer these questions. In turn, the answers have often been formulated around the traditional opposition between the body and the mind. To resolve this opposition, Extended Mind theory questions whether it is possible to understand the mind beyond the brain, and even beyond the individual himself.

In the following text we will briefly see what are the proposals of the Extended Mind hypothesis, as well as some of its main antecedents.

• Related article: "Where is the mind located?"

Extended Mind Theory: mental processes beyond the brain?

The Extended Mind theory began its formal development in 1998,

from the works of the philosopher Susan Hurley, who proposed that mental processes did not necessarily have to be explained as internal processes, since the mind did not only exist within the narrow limits of the skull. In his work "Consciousness in action" he criticized the input / output perspective of traditional cognitive theory.

In the same year, the philosophers Andy Clark and David Chalmers published the article "The extended mind" which is considered the founding text of this theory. And a decade later, in 2008, Andy Clark publishes Supersizing the mind, which ends up introducing the hypothesis of the extended mind in the debates of the philosophy of mind and cognitive sciences.

From the computational metaphor to the cyborg metaphor

The Extended Mind theories are part of the historical development of the philosophy of mind and the cognitive sciences. Within this development different theories have emerged about the functioning of mental states and its consequences in human life. We will briefly see what the latter consists of.

The individualistic model and computation

The most classical tradition of cognitive science has taken the metaphor of the computational operating system as an explanatory model of the mind. Broadly speaking, it proposes that cognitive processing begins with inputs (sensory inputs), and ends with outpus (behavioral outputs).

In the same sense, the mental states are faithful representations of the elements of the world, they are produced before internal manipulations of the information, and they generate a series of inferences. For example, perception would be an individual and precise reflection of the outside world; Y occurs by internal logical order similar to that of a digital operating system.

In this way, the mind or mental states are an entity that is inside each individual. In fact, it is these states that give us the quality of being subjects (autonomous and independent of the environment and its relations with it).

It is a theory that follows the dualistic and individualistic tradition on reasoning and the human being; whose maximum precursor was Rene Descartes, who doubted everything except what he thought. So much so that we inherited the now famous "I think, therefore I exist."

But, with the development of science, it was possible to suggest that the mind is not just an abstraction but there is a tangible place within the human body for storage. This place is the brain, which under the premises of the computational perspective would fulfill the hardware functions, insofar as it deals with the material and self-configurable support of the processes mental.

The mind-brain identity

The foregoing emerges in continuous debate with theories of mind-brain identity, which suggest that mental processes they are nothing more than physicochemical activity of the brain.

In this sense, the brain is not only the material support of mental processes, but the mind itself is the result of the activity of said organ; with which, it can only be understood through the physical laws of nature. Both mental processes and subjectivity thus become an epiphenomenon (secondary phenomena to physical events in the brain).

In this sense it is a theory of naturalistic approach, and in addition to a cerebrocentric theory, since everything human would be reduced to the action potentials and the physicochemical activity of our neural networks. Among the most representative of these theories is, for example, materialistic eliminativism or neurological monism.

• You may be interested: "Dualism in Psychology"

Beyond the brain (and the individual)

Faced with the latter, other theories or explanatory models of the mind arise. One of them is the Extended Mind theory, which has tried to locate information processing, and other mental states, beyond the brain; that is, in the relationships that the person establishes with the environment and her objects.

It is a question, then, of extending the concept of "mind" beyond the individual himself. The latter represents a major break with individualism typical of the most classical cognitive science.

But in order to achieve this, it was necessary to begin by redefining both the concept of mind and mental processes, and in this, the reference model was the functionalist. In other words, it was necessary to understand mental processes from the effects they cause, or as effects caused by different causes.

This paradigm had already permeated computational hypotheses as well. However, for the Extended Mind theory, mental processes are not only generated within the individual, but outside of it. And they are "functional" states insofar as are defined by a cause-effect relationship with a given function (A relationship that encompasses a set of material elements, even without a life of its own).

To put it another way, mental states are the last link in a long chain of causes that ultimately have these processes as an effect. And the other links in the chain can range from bodily and sensorimotor skills, to a calculator, a computer, a watch, or a cell phone. All this insofar as they are elements that allow us to generate what we know as intelligence, thought, beliefs and so on.

Consequently, our mind extends beyond the specific limits of our brain, and even beyond our general physical limits.

So what is a "subject"?

The above not only changes the way of understanding the "mind" but also the definition of the "I" (it is understood as a "I extended ”), as well as the definition of the conduct itself, since it is no longer a planned action rationally. Is about learning that is the result of practices in the material environment. As a result, the "individual" is more of a "subject / agent."

For this reason, this theory is considered by many as a radical and active determinism. It is no longer about the environment shaping the mind, but rather that the environment is part of the mind itself: "cognitive states have a wide location and not limited by the narrow border of the human body ”(Andrada de Gregorio and Sánchez Parera, 2005).

The subject it is capable of being constantly modified by its continuous contact with the other material elements. But it is not enough just to have a first contact (for example, with a technological device) to consider it an extension of the mind and the subject. In order to think about it this way, it is essential that conditions such as automation and accessibility exist.

To exemplify this, Clark and Chalmers (cited by Andrada de Gregorio and Sánchez Parera, 2005) give as an example a subject who has Alzheimer's. To compensate for his memory loss, the subject writes down everything that seems important to him in a notebook; to such an extent that, automatically, it is customary to review this tool in the interaction and resolution of everyday problems.

The notebook serves as a storage device for your beliefs, as well as a material extension of your memory. The notebook then plays an active role in cognition of this person, and together, they establish a cognitive system.

The latter opens up a new question: does the extension of the mind have limits? According to its authors, mental activity occurs in constant negotiation with these limits. However, the Extended Mind theory has been challenged precisely for not offering concrete answers to this.

Likewise, the Extended Mind theory has been rejected by the more brain-centered perspectives, of which they are important exponents. the philosophers of the mind Robert Rupert and Jerry Fodor. In this sense, it has also been questioned for not delving into the field of subjective experiences, and for focusing on a vision strongly focused on the achievement of objectives.

Are we all cyborgs?

It seems that the Extended Mind theory comes close to proposing that human beings are and act as a hybrid species similar to the cyborg figure. The latter understood as the fusion between a living organism and a machine, and whose purpose is to enhance, or in some cases replace, the organic functions.

In fact, the term "cyborg" is an Anglicism that means "cybernetic organism". But the Extended Mind theory is not the only one that has allowed us to reflect on this question. In fact, a few years before the founding works, in 1983 feminist philosopher Donna Haraway published an essay called Cyborg Manifesto.

Broadly speaking, by means of this metaphor he tried to question the problems of Western traditions strongly established in a “dualism antagonistic ”, with visible effects on escelialismo, colonialism and patriarchy (issues that have been present in some traditions of the feminism).

Thus, we could say that the cyborg metaphor opens up the possibility of thinking a hybrid subject beyond mind-body dualisms. The difference between one and the other is that the Extended Mind proposal is part of a tradition closer to logical positivism, with a very specific conceptual rigor; while Haraway's proposal follows the line of critical theory, with a determining socio-political component (Andrada de Gregorio and Sánchez Parera, 2005).

Bibliographic references:

• Garcia, I. (2014). Review by Andy Clark and David Chalmers, The extended mind, KRK, Ediciones, Oviedo, 2011. Diánoia, LIX (72): 169-172.
• Andrada de Gregorio, G. and Sánchez Parera, P. (2005). Towards a continental-analytic alliance: the cyborg and the extended mind. Guindilla Bunda Coord Collective. (Ábalos, H.; García, J.; Jiménez, A. Montañez, D.) Memories of the 50th.