The Mind-Brain Identity Theory: what does it consist of?

The Mind-Brain Identity Theory It is one of the areas of study of the philosophy of mind, which is, in turn, the branch of philosophy in charge of investigating and reflect on mental processes and their relationship to physical principles, especially those that take place in the brain.

These issues have been addressed through very different proposals. One of them holds that mental states and their contents (the beliefs, the thought, meanings, sensations, intentions, etc.) are nothing more than neural processes, it is that is, the set of complex activities that takes place in a specific physical-chemical organ: the brain.

We know this approach as physicalism, neurological monism, or Mind-Brain Identity Theory.

What does the Mind-Brain Identity Theory say?

The philosophy of mind is responsible for studying and theorizing about the mind-brain relationship, a problem that has been with us for many centuries, but which has become especially acute in from the second half of the twentieth century, when computer science, cognitive science, and the

neurosciences they became part of the same discussion.

This discussion was already the first precedent for what the American neurologist would declare Eric kandel in the year 2000: if the 20th century was the century of genetics; the 21st century is the century of neuroscience, or more specifically, it is the century of the biology of the mind.

However, the main exponents of the Mind-Brain Identity Theory are found in the 1950s: British philosopher U.T. Place and the Austrian philosopher Herbert Feigl, between others. A little earlier, at the beginning of the 20th century, it was E.G. Boring was the first to use the term "identity theory" in relation to the mind-brain problem.

We could still go back a bit, and find that some bases were conceived by philosophers and scientists such as Leucippus, Hobbes, La Matiere or d’Holbach. The latter made a suggestion that would seem like a joke, but which, in reality, is quite close to the proposals of the Mind-Brain Identity Theory: just as the liver secretes bile, the brain secretes thought.

Contemporary Mind-Brain Identity Theory holds that states and processes of the mind are identical to brain processes, that is, they do not It is that mental processes have a correlation with the physical processes of the brain, but that mental processes are nothing more than activities neuronal.

This theory denies that there are subjective experiences with non-physical properties (which in philosophy of mind are known as “qualia”), thereby reducing psychic and intentional acts to the activity of neurons. That is why it is known as a physicalist theory or also as neurological monism.

Some fundamental principles

One of the central arguments of the Mind-Brain Identity Theory is that only the physical laws of nature are what allow us to explain what the world is like, including the human being and his cognitive processes (that is why there are those who also call this theory "naturalism").

From here, proposals with different nuances are derived. For example, that mental processes are not phenomena with their own realities, but in any case are accessory phenomena that accompany the main phenomenon (the physical) without any influence on he. Mental processes and subjectivity would then be a set of epiphenomena.

If we go a little further, the next thing that holds is that all the things that we call beliefs, intentions, desires, experiences, common sense, etc. They are empty words that we have put to the complex processes that occur in the brain, because that way the scientific community (and not scientific as well) can be better understood.

And at one of the most extreme poles, we can find as part of the Mind-Brain Identity Theory, at materialistic eliminativism, a philosophical position that even proposes to eliminate the conceptual apparatus with which we have explained to the mind, and replace it with the concepts of neurosciences, so that it has greater rigor scientific

Are we more than a set of neurons?

One of the criticisms of this philosophical position is that the philosophical practice itself, as well as the construction of theories about the mind, could be denying themselves when they position themselves in physicalism or neurological monism, since, far from being rigorous theoretical and scientific reflections, the philosophy of the mind itself would be nothing more than a set of processes neuronal.

It has also been criticized for being a strongly reductionist position., which denies subjective experiences, which might not be enough to understand a large part of social and individual phenomena. Among other things this would happen because practical level it is difficult to get rid of notions such as feelings, thoughts, freedom, common sense, etc. because they are notions that have effects in terms of how we perceive ourselves and relate to both the idea we have of ourselves and of others.

Bibliographic references:

• Sanguineti, J.J. (2008). Philosophy of Mind. Published June 2008 in Philosophica, Online Philosophical Encyclopedia. Retrieved April 24, 2018. Available in https://s3.amazonaws.com/academia.edu.documents/31512350/Voz_Filosofia_Mente.pdf? AWSAccessKeyId = AKIAIWOWYYGZ2Y53UL3A & Expires = 1524565811 & Signature = c21BcswSPp1JIGSmQ% 2FaI1djoPGE% 3D & response-content-disposition = inline% 3B% 20filename% 3DFilosofia_de_la_mente_Vocionarzi.pdfi_Vocionarz.
• Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2007). The Mind / Brain Identity Theory. Originally published Jan 12, 2000; revised May 18, 2007. Retrieved April 24, 2018. Available in https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mind-identity/#His