Materialistic Eliminativism: a philosophy that discards subjectivity

Materialist Eliminativism is the philosophical position that denies the existence of "mental states", proposing to eliminate the apparatus explanatory that has led us to understand the "mind" as we have done since the seventeenth century, and create another that takes up the material conditions of existence.

Although it is a radical proposal, Materialistic Eliminativism has had an important impact on the way of doing philosophy and a special impact on contemporary psychology. What exactly is eliminativism and where does it come from?

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Eliminativism: Do Mental States Really Exist?

The "mind" is a concept that we use so often that we could hardly doubt its existence. In fact, to a large extent scientific psychology has been devoted to studying processes such as common sense, beliefs or sensations; derived from a specific and fairly widespread understanding of the "mind" or "mental states".

As early as the seventeenth century, Descartes had insisted that the only thing human beings cannot doubt is our ability to think, with which the foundations are laid for the development of our current concept of "mind", "consciousness", "mental states" and even psychology modern.

What Materialistic Eliminativism does is take up all this, but to open a debate on whether these concepts refer to things that really exist, and therefore, it is questioned if it is prudent to continue using them.

It is then a contemporary proposal that says that our way of understanding mental states has a series of shortcomings fundamental, which even make some concepts invalid, such as beliefs, feelings, common sense, and others whose existence is difficult for us to question.

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Some fundamental philosophical proposals

Materialist Eliminativism proposes that, beyond modifying the way in which we have understood the mind, what we should do is eliminate all the explanatory apparatus that has led us to describe it (that is why it is called "Eliminativism"). The reason: mental states are non-existent things, in any case it would be brain or neuronal phenomena, with which it would be necessary to formulate a new explanatory apparatus based on material reality (that is why it is "materialistic").

In other words, Materialistic Eliminativism analyzes some concepts about the mind and mental states, and concludes that they are notions empty because they are often reduced to intentional properties or subjective experiences that do not refer to something that has a reality physical.

From there a second proposal is derived: the conceptual framework of neurosciences would have to be the one that explains mental states, because these sciences can refer to realities materials.

As in all philosophical currents, there are different nuances depending on the author; There are those who say that the question is not that both the non-existence of mental states, but that they are not right described, so they should be replaced by the concepts that have been suggested in brain studies. In this same sense, the concept "qualia" is another proposal that has highlighted the gap between explanations of subjective experiences and physical systems, especially the brain system.

Finally, Materialist Eliminativism has also raised questions, for example, the question of where the boundaries lie between eliminativism and materialist reductionism.

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Eliminativism has not only been materialistic

Eliminativism has had many facets. Broadly speaking, we could see some tints of eliminativism in several of the philosophical and deterministic proposals of the 18th century who questioned concepts also related to psychology, such as "freedom" or the "I". In fact, materialism itself is already an eliminativist position, inasmuch as the conditions of existence of non-material elements are rejected.

We usually know as Materialist Eliminativism the position that specifically denies the existence of mental states. It is a more or less recent proposal, which arises from the philosophy of mind and whose main antecedent is the work of the philosopher Charlie Dunbar Broad; but that formally arises in the second half of the 20th century among the works of Wilfred Sellars, W.V.O. Quine, Paul Feyerabend, Richard Rorty, Paul and Patricia Churchland, and S. Stitch. That is why it is also known as contemporary Materialist Eliminativism.

Formally, the term "Materialist Eliminativism" attributed to a 1968 publication by James Cornman entitled "On the elimination of" Sensations "and Sensations".

Impact on modern psychology

In its more modern versions, Materialistic Eliminativism proposes that our understanding of "common sense," "mental states," or psychological processes such as such as desires or beliefs is deeply mistaken because they arise from postulates that are not really observable, with which its explanatory value is questionable.

In other words, Materialistic Eliminativism allows update discussions on the mind-body relationship (using the mind-brain formula) and suggest, for example, that beliefs, not having a physiological correlate, they should be eliminated or replaced by some concept that, if it has a physical correlate; and in the same vein is the proposal that, strictly speaking, sensations are not really "sensations" but rather are brain processes, so we should reconsider their use.

In short, from Materialist Eliminativism common sense psychology and cognitive science are challenged. It is not surprising that in recent decades this position has gained great force, especially in the debates on cognitive sciences, neurosciences and the philosophy of mind. Furthermore, this has been the subject of discussion not only for studies of the mind but also for those who analyze the processes of construction and transformation of modern theoretical frameworks.

Undoubtedly, it is a current that has not only raised fundamental questions about our way of understanding ourselves and our surroundings, Rather, from there, he notes that the most popular explanations are largely insufficient as well as susceptible to being updated. constantly.

Bibliographic references:

• Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2013). Eliminative Materialism. Retrieved April 19, 2018. Available in https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/materialism-eliminative/#BriHis.
• Braun, R. (2008). Philosophical eliminativism and its attack on psychology. Person, 11: 51-67.
• Feser, E. (2005). Philosophy of mind: A short introduction. Oneworld publications: United Kingdom.