Verificationism: what it is and what are its philosophical proposals

One of the criteria for scientific demarcation is verificationism, the idea that for something to be considered significant it must be empirically demonstrated or, better said, be able to be grasped through the senses.

Over the years there have been several currents that could be considered as supporters of this criterion of scientific demarcation, although it is true that using his particular vision of what is understood as knowledge significant.

Next, we are going to see what verificationism is, what historical currents could be considered as followers of this idea and what it is that differentiates it from falsificationism.

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Verificationism: what it is, historical currents and falsificationism

Verificationism, also called the criterion of significance, is a term used to describe the current followed by those who are in favor of using the principle of verification in science, that is, to maintain that only the statements (hypotheses, theories ...) that are empirically verifiable (p. g., through the senses) are cognitively significant. That is, if something cannot be demonstrated through the senses, physical experience, or perception, then it is a rather rejectable idea.

The criterion of significance has been a subject of debate among even those who say they feel verificationists, basically because many philosophical debates are made about the veracity of statements that are not empirically verifiable. Verificationism has come to be used as a rule to show that metaphysical, ethical and religious statements are meaningless, although not all verificationists consider that these types of statements are not verifiable, as would be the case of classical pragmatists.

1. Empiricism

Taking a historical perspective on the idea of ​​verificationism, we can put its earliest origins in empiricism, with figures such as the English philosopher John Locke (1632-1704). The main premise in empiricism is that the only source of knowledge is experience through the senses., something that verificationism really defends and that, in fact, it could be said that the verification criterion is the consequence of this first empiricist idea.

Within empiricist philosophy, it was held that the ideas that haunt our minds have to be the result of perception-sensation, that is, sensations that we have converted into ideas or it is also the combination of those same ideas obtained through experience converted into new concepts. In turn, this movement is associated with the idea that there is no possible way to make an idea come to our mind without being connected to perceptions and that, therefore, it must be able to be empirically verifiable. Otherwise it would be a fantasy.

This conception of where ideas came from led empiricists like David hume to reject philosophical positions about ideas of a more metaphysical type, such as the existence of God, the soul or one's own being. This was motivated by the fact that these concepts and any other spiritual idea do not actually have a physical object of the Whatever emanates, that is, there is no empirically experiential element from which the idea of ​​God, the soul, or one's own being derives.

• You may be interested in: "John Locke: biography of this British philosopher"

2. Logical positivism

The philosophical current that has been most related to verificationism is, without a doubt, logical positivism. Until the 1920s, the reflections that were made about science were characterized by being the fruit of isolated thinkers, philosophers who had little interaction with each other. others and that they chose to debate on other questions of philosophical interest, although this does not mean that there were no antecedents in debate on how it should be delimited scientific.

In 1922, what was called the Vienna Circle was formed in Austria., a group of thinkers meeting for the first time to discuss at length about what science was, including both philosophers and scientists. The members of this circle cannot be considered as "pure" philosophers, since they had worked in some field particular scientist and had been getting an idea of ​​what science was from their first-hand experience.

Fruit of this group arises the epistemological current of logical positivism, having among its great references figures such as Rudolf Carnal (1891-1970) and Otto Neurath (1882-1945). This movement made verificationism its central thesis for the purpose of unify philosophy and science under a common naturalistic theory of knowledge. His objective was that, if he did so, he could clearly delimit what is scientific from what is not, focusing research efforts on ideas that will really contribute to the development of the humanity.

3. Pragmatism

Although pragmatism appeared before logical positivism, its influence on this second movement was rather few, although they did have in common their interest in verifying knowledge to consider it significant. Likewise, there are quite a few differences between the two movements, the main one being the fact that pragmatism was not in favor of completely rejecting disciplines such as the metaphysics, morality, religion and ethics for the simple fact that many of its postulates were not empirically demonstrable, something that the followers were in favor of. positivists.

The pragmatists considered that, rather than rejecting metaphysics, ethics or religion for the simple fact of not exceeding the principle of verification, it was appropriate to propose a new norm to be able to carry out good metaphysics, religion and ethics, without forgetting the fact that they are not empirically demonstrable disciplines but no less useful in different contexts.

4. Counterfeiting

The opposite idea or, rather, antagonistic to verificationism is falsificationism. This concept refers to the fact that an observational fact must be sought that can nullify an initial statement, hypothesis or theory and that, if it is not found, the original idea is reinforced. Verificationism would be the opposite in the sense that empirical evidence is sought to demonstrate the theory raised, so that this is corraborated and that, if not, it is considered that it has not passed the criterion of check. Both concepts are inscribed within the problem of inductivism.

It is commonly believed that it was Karl Popper (1902-1994) who rejected the requirement that for that a postulate is significant must be verifiable, asking that instead of this they be falseables. Anyway, Popper later indicated that his claim of falsifiability was not intended to be a theory of meaning, but rather a methodological proposal for the sciences.. But despite this fact, there are not a few who group Popper in the group of verificationists, despite being a fair critic of verificationism.

This problem refers to the fact that something universal cannot be affirmed from the particular data that experience offers us. For example, for millions of white swans that we see, we cannot say that "all swans are white." On the other hand, if we find a black swan, even if it is only one, we can affirm without any doubt that “not all swans are white”. It is for this same idea that Popper chooses to introduce falsificationism as a criterion for scientific demarcation.